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Summary
Human behavior is not always consistent with stan-
dard rational choice predictions. Apparent deviations
from rational choice predictions provide a promising
arena for the merger of economics and biology [1–6].
Although little is known about the extent to which
other species exhibit these seemingly irrational pat-
terns [7–9], similarities across species would suggest
a common evolutionary root to the phenomena. The
present study investigated whether chimpanzees
exhibit an endowment effect, a seemingly paradoxical
behavior in which humans tend to value a good they
have just come to possess more than they would
have only a moment before [10–13]. We show the first
evidence that chimpanzees do exhibit an endowment
effect, by favoring items they just received more than
their preferred items that could be acquired through
exchange. Moreover, the effect is stronger for food
than for less evolutionarily salient objects, perhaps
because of historically greater risks associated with
keeping a valuable item versus attempting to ex-
change it for another [14, 15]. These findings suggest
that many seeming deviations from rational choice
predictions may be common to humans and chimpan-
zees and that the evaluation of these through a lens of
evolutionary relevance may yield further insights in
humans and other species.
Results and Discussion
The endowment effect (sometimes called the ‘‘status
quo bias’’ [16]) describes the tendency to value a good
that one has just come to possess significantly more
than the maximum price one would have paid to acquire
it a moment ago [10–13]. The precise cause and extent
of the effect are much debated [17–20]; however, many
studies suggest that ownership (endowment) alone
instantaneously increases humans’ subjective value of
*Correspondence: sbrosnan@gsu.edua good [10–13, 21–23]. This effect of ownership seems
illogical because the good has not changed and no
new information or experience can yet have been
acquired. The pricing skew that the endowment effect
creates has significance beyond paradox because it
can impede efficient allocation and exchange of goods
and tradable rights [15, 24]. From an evolutionary per-
spective, however, some inclination to value goods
one possessed over goods one might obtain through
exchange may have been adaptive. Exchanges are
fraught with the potential for defection, particularly in
the absence of reliable property rights and third-party
enforcement mechanisms (such as the legal rules and
institutions of modern humans). In the present study,
we investigate whether the endowment effect is present
in chimpanzees and how the evolutionary salience of
the objects affects the response.
This study was modified from Knetsch’s study [12],
which suggested that humans often prefer to maintain
an object they have just acquired over one they could
achieve through exchange. Subjects were given a coffee
mug or chocolate bar for agreeing to complete a ques-
tionnaire, then, after completion, were offered the
opportunity to exchange their item for the other. One
group was initially endowed with a mug, the second
with a chocolate bar, and the third was given a choice
between the two (with no opportunity to exchange).
Subjects from the former groups showed a stronger
tendency to maintain the object in their possession
than would be expected on the basis of preferences
shown by the third group.
For our study, we used two versions of the paradigm,
one with food and one with nonfood items, to test the
hypothesis that, in chimpanzees, evolutionarily relevant
stimuli may elicit different responses. We used a within-
subjects design in which chimpanzees encountered six
trials, three for food and three for nonfood. The three
trials for each version consisted of (1) a choice between
items (between two foods or between two nonfoods)
and (2) one trial each in which chimpanzees were given
one item (food or nonfood) and allowed to exchange
for the other of the same category. An endowment effect
could be concluded if there was a stronger tendency to
maintain possession of an item than is expected on the
basis of their separately expressed preferences.
This design has several advantages. First, it allows for
a good comparison between humans [12] and chimpan-
zees. Second, the exchange methodology has been
used successfully in the past for examining complex
phenomena in chimpanzees [25, 26]. Finally, our within-
subjects design allowed us to test for the endowment
effect both at the population (as in Knetsch) and individ-
ual levels and thus enabled a more detailed analysis [27].
Subjects were 33 chimpanzees housed at the Michale
E. Keeling Center for Comparative Medicine and Re-
search of The University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer
Center. Food items were a frozen fruit-juice stick and
a PVC pipe filled with peanut butter (PB), both of which
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sumed by chimpanzees, diminishing impulse-control
problems. Nonfood items were a rubber-bone dog
chew toy and a knotted-rope dog toy (hereafter, bone
and rope), both of which are made of the same materials
as enrichment items to which the chimpanzees have
regular access.
To replicate Knetsch [12], we first examined data for
the population. As a group, 58% of the chimpanzees
preferred PB to juice. However, when endowed with
the PB, 79% of the chimpanzees preferred to keep the
PB rather than exchange for juice (Figure 1; c2 = 6.079,
p = 0.014); this is approximately 20% more of the popu-
lation than would be expected from the population-
wide preference. Likewise, when endowed with juice
(42% preference), 58% of the chimpanzees chose to
keep the juice rather than exchange for peanut butter
(c2 = 3.102, p = 0.078), reflecting an endowment effect
in approximately 15%. To compare to humans, in
Knetsch’s study, approximately 33% more people kept
their mugs and 46% more kept their chocolate bars
than expected given the population preferences under
the choice condition.
For nonfoods, subjects showed a preference to
exchange the object rather than an endowment effect.
The population preference for bone over rope was
74%. However, when endowed with the item, subjects
kept the bone only 16% of the time (Figure 1; c2 =
54.587, p < 0.001) and the rope only 10% of the time
(c2 = 4.212, p = 0.040). Both of these indicate far more
exchange of nonfood items than predicted by their
separately expressed preferences, indicating that for
nonfoods, chimpanzees either lack strong preferences
or prefer human interaction over the object.
The previous analysis masks the behavior of individ-
uals. If the endowment effect were present at the indi-
vidual level, subjects should maintain possession of
both the more-preferred and the less-favored item.
This was the most common behavior for food items,
with 42% of individuals maintaining possession of
both foods (Figure 2; c2 = 9.14, p < 0.05). Thirty-three
percent of the subjects showed behavior that matched
their preferences, by maintaining possession of the
preferred food and exchanging the less-favored food.
Seven percent of subjects exchanged in both situations,
indicating a preference for interaction. Eighteen percent
Figure 1. Population-Level Comparisons of Preferences in the
Choice and Endowed Conditions
Data are presented as mean + SE. Hatched bars represent the
percentage of the population that preferred the object in a choice
condition, and solid bars represent the percentage of the population
that chose to maintain possession.of individuals behaved inconsistently with their prefer-
ence under the choice condition, perhaps indicating
a weak preference between the items.
For nonfoods, only one subject (3%) maintained pos-
session of both items, indicating an endowment effect.
The majority of subjects exchanged in both situations
(Figure 2; 77% of subjects, c2 = 39.41, p < 0.05), perhaps
indicating that for less evolutionarily salient objects,
subjects are more interested in the interaction than in
the items themselves (see below). Six percent of sub-
jects showed exchange behavior consistent with their
established preferences, and 13% showed exchange
behavior inconsistent with their established prefer-
ences.
Finally, we directly compared the individuals’ re-
sponses in the food and nonfood conditions. Individuals
were much more likely to exchange nonfoods than
foods (t = 9.133, df = 29, p < 0.001), and no subject ex-
changed more frequently for foods than nonfoods.
The food rewards were originally chosen to be close in
value because large differences in preference would
probably result in the favored item being chosen every
time, and only a single preference test was run to avoid
overexposing the subjects to the commodities. To verify
the stability of the chimpanzees’ preferences, we ran
three additional food choice sessions. Again, 69% of
subjects chose PB. Additionally, this preference was
extremely consistent; 69% of subjects chose PB in the
first of the three sessions, and 67% of subjects chose
PB in the first trial of each of the three sessions. This
consistency indicates that the single choice in the orig-
inal study adequately described the population food
preferences.
For evaluating whether exchange was due to a prefer-
ence for interacting with the experimenter, subjects
were presented with each of the four items, and ex-
change was solicited for an identical object. No subject
exchanged the PB, and only one subject exchanged the
juice. The converse was true with the objects; 82% of
subjects (23 of 28) traded a bone for a bone, and 79%
Figure 2. The Behavior of Individuals in the Four Tests
Data are presented as mean + SE. ‘‘Kept both’’ indicates individuals
who chose to maintain possession of both foods or both nonfoods
rather than exchange; ‘‘kept preferred’’ indicates individuals who
chose to maintain possession of their favorite item but exchanged
for the other when endowed with their less preferred, ‘‘kept nonpre-
ferred’’ indicates individuals who chose to maintain possession of
their nonpreferred item but exchanged for the other when endowed
with their preferred item, and ‘‘exchanged both’’ indicates individ-
uals who chose to exchange for the other item in both situations.
Solid bars indicate food items and hatched bars indicate nonfood
items.
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1706(22 of 28) traded a rope for a rope, compared to 84% of
subjects trading a bone for a rope and 90% of subjects
trading a rope for a bone in the original exchanges. Thus,
in contrast to the result for foods, for toys the interaction
with the experimenter is apparently preferred over the
object itself.
Finally, to verify that subjects were willing to trade the
foods, we offered to trade a small piece of frozen juice
for a whole stick. Thirty-six percent (10 of 28) of subjects
made this trade. However, the smaller piece of frozen
juice was bite sized, thereby enabling immediate con-
sumption, which could preclude an opportunity for sub-
sequent trade. Consequently, we ran a second study
with foods that could not be eaten as rapidly, to avoid
potential complications from poor impulse control.
Subjects could trade a frozen-juice stick (the same size
as in previous tests) for a banana (a preferred food) of
approximately the same length. Twenty-six of 29 sub-
jects (90%) exchanged on the first presentation, and
the remaining three did so on the second trial. Thus,
whereas 58% of chimpanzees kept the frozen juice
when they were offered a trade for PB, only 10% kept
it when they were offered a banana (and none kept it in
their second opportunity). This, combined with the
sharp difference between exchange behavior for food
and nonfood items, supports the conclusion that the
frequent failure to exchange a less-favored food for
a more-preferred food was an active choice to maintain
possession of the food item. This is consistent with
human behavior that has been interpreted as an endow-
ment effect [12].
Three features of chimpanzee ecology may help ex-
plain the differences in endowment-effect prevalence
between foods and nonfoods. The first is that foods
have more significant effects on fitness than nonfood
items. Second, chimpanzees do not show long-term
possession or storage, so items neither accumulate
nor have value outside their immediate utility (S.F.B.,
M. Grady, S.P.L., S.J.S., and M.J. Beran, unpublished
data). Third, chimpanzees lack the reliable, institutional-
ized, third-party bargain-enforcement mechanisms that
humans have. This renders each exchange inherently
risky because there can be no guarantee that giving up
one item will yield another, instead of a total loss.
Thus, for chimpanzees, and early humans, there was
likely to be a fitness advantage to maintaining posses-
sion of some items even in the presence of superior
exchange options, thereby making selectively posses-
sive behavior that appears irrational in the moment
rational from an evolutionary perspective. Humans in
modern times may still exhibit stronger endowment
effects in evolutionarily salient situations, a hypothesis
that warrants further empirical investigation in light of
the puzzlingly varying frequencies and magnitudes in
which humans exhibit endowment effects and other
seemingly paradoxical behaviors.
As with any evolutionary explanation, it is difficult to
fully exclude other possibilities, although several of
these do not explain the data as well. For example,
this effect cannot be attributed to an inability to delay
gratification because chimpanzees can delay gratifica-
tion for food within their reach for at least 120 s [28],
far longer than required in the current study. Moreover,
some models of the endowment effect predict that itwill be weaker for items that one knows cannot be
kept [20]. Although this more deliberative explanation
might have played some role in our subjects’ responses
to toys, socially housed chimpanzees such as these can
withhold objects from humans until they are ready to
relinquish them. Finally, some attribute of the items
may affect behavior. For instance, food items in the
wild might increase in value, after preparation for eating,
whereas toys may be valuable for novelty and only when
new. Yet our subjects exchanged toys for an identical
toy, indicating that novelty was not particularly salient.
The most obvious explanation is that subjects like to
exchange and that food outweighs the utility of the
exchange interaction, whereas objects have less utility
than the interaction. Yet, this explanation begs the ques-
tion of why chimpanzees prefer food over objects and
interactions in the first place.
Understanding the evolution of widespread behaviors
that are often considered economically paradoxical or
‘‘irrational’’ may deepen understanding of their potential
functions and thus their patterns in both human and
nonhuman species (O.D.J. and S.F.B., unpublished
data). Our results suggest that the basis of these asym-
metries in exchange behavior is shared by humans and
chimpanzees. This in turn indicates that their presence
in humans is probably the result of common evolution-
ary processes rather than, as is often assumed, either
cognitive quirks unique to human brains and experience
or misunderstandings of experimental instructions (also
unique to humans). Further cross-species research on
other areas in which humans demonstrate apparently
irrational economic behaviors might elucidate the situa-
tions in which they are relevant and shed light on the
evolutionary history of this class of behaviors. Such
research will help to provide a much-needed theoretical
foundation for human deviations from standard rational
choice predictions.
Experimental Procedures
Subjects were adult chimpanzees drawn from a population of
socially housed chimpanzees. No food or water deprivation was
done prior to testing, so subject motivation depended on the pres-
ence of rare and favored treats. All subjects participated voluntarily
and isolated from the rest of their group (for minimization of distrac-
tions). No subject received more than one trial per day. Thirty-seven
subjects began the experiments, but analyses reflect data from only
the individuals that completed all sessions for food or nonfood
items. Food items were chosen to be difficult to consume rapidly
and easy for chimpanzees to pass through caging (required for
exchange). Nonfood items were introduced for this test but were
of the same color and materials as other routine enrichment objects.
Prior to the study, all subjects had been trained to exchange
objects back to the experimenter for a food reward. During
exchange trials, subjects were first shown both objects, then one
object was given to the chimpanzee and the other was immediately
offered for exchange. Chimpanzees had to return the object they
possessed to the experimenter within 120 s (and with no more
than a single taste) to obtain the other. Half of subjects began with
the three food trials; the other half began with nonfood trials. Other-
wise, trials were completed in random order. A forced-choice task
elicited subjects’ favorite foods [29, 30]. For this, chimpanzees
were offered two different rewards and received the one to which
they gestured [29].
To compare frequency of exchange in food versus nonfood condi-
tions, subjects who completed all six sessions (n = 30) were given
a score, calculated by subtracting the number of exchanges in the
food conditions with those in the nonfood conditions. A t test
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was the same in both conditions.
Approximately 12 months later, several control experiments were
run on 28 of the original subjects, with identical methodology and re-
wards to the above. Trials were always randomized within a session.
Subjects first completed three food-choice sessions, each consist-
ing of four trials in which they had to choose between the two food
choices. After this, subjects were given a single session of four trials
in which subjects were given an item (frozen juice, peanut butter,
rope, and bone) and then allowed to exchange for an identical
item. Finally, subjects were given a session in which they could ex-
change either a medium (3 inch) or small (1.5 inch) piece of frozen
juice for a whole juice stick (6 inches). Each option was offered twice.
Next, subjects were given a single session in which they were given
a whole juice stick and allowed to exchange for a whole banana. If
subjects failed to exchange, they were given one additional trial.
All procedures used in the research are in accordance with the
Guidelines for the Use of Animals in Research and have been
approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee of
UT/MD Anderson Cancer Center.
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